Tuesday, February 17, 2015

The Impact of Sustaining Givers on Public Radio Fund Drives

The movement to monthly sustaining givers has been good for many public radio stations, improving annual donor retention and monthly cash flow. The impact on fund drives is less clear.

There's not a lot of readily available national data on the subject, but we've seen mixed results across a few dozen client stations over the past three years. It appears the increase in sustaining members has reduced fund drive efficiencies for two reasons.

The pool of donors who might renew their membership during the drive is smaller because many of the most loyal donors are now sustainers. And additional gifts are a tougher sell since part of the sustainer pitch is that the listener is already supporting the station every month.

These two issues seem to have a greater effect on stations that ran efficient fundraising programs prior to seeking sustaining members. Stations that were less efficient to begin with get a longer grace period before their on-air drives are affected.

Perhaps a bigger issue now facing many stations is the multi-year impact of sustainer programs on fund drive cash flow. Every station has to manage the initial cash flow hit of starting a sustainer program. That's because the pledges that used to fulfill all at once now take 12 months to fulfill. The later in the fiscal year a sustainer is acquired, the less cash flow value that listener has in the current fiscal year.

In theory, the station is trading short-term fund drive cash for ongoing monthly sustainer cash. In practice, we are seeing stations trying to increase both. As a result, fund drive cash flow expectations are no longer being adjusted proportionately to sustainer pledges received during the drive. Drive goals are going up in a more difficult fundraising environment.

Here’s an example using a station with a drive goal of $300,000 in pledged dollars. Sorry about all of the numbers.

Prior to its sustainer program the station could count on $270,000 or more of that $300,000 to fulfill in the fiscal year. With a sustainer program, at least $100,000 of the pledged dollars are now being paid monthly (1/3 of pledged dollars).

If that drive occurs halfway through the fiscal year, then only half of the sustainer money fulfills in the fiscal year. That’s a $50,000 hit to fiscal year cash flow. Now only $220,000 fulfills in the fiscal year. Over three drives, on-air fundraising contributes $100,000 less per year to cash flow.

What we’re starting to see is that after the initial implementation of a sustainer program, stations aren’t willing to take that big of a cash flow hit on the fund drive revenue line. Rising budgets keep putting pressure on fund drives to deliver more immediate cash. So fund drive cash flow expectations are no longer being reduced deeply enough to account for sustainers. In some cases cash flow goals are approaching the same levels as the pre-sustainer drives. 

The consequence is that the station has to raise its overall fund drive goal to meet the cash flow projection for the drive. Going back to our example, to raise $270,000 in current fiscal year cash with the sustainer model, the drive goal now has to be $380,000. That’s 27% higher than the pre-sustainer model. In a tougher on-air fundraising environment.

As a rule of thumb, the more successful a station is with sustainers, the less reliant it must become on fund drives for cash flow. It also must become better at multi-year, multi-channel revenue planning. If it doesn’t, then drive goals must be increased with the understanding that getting more immediate cash out of a drive and getting more sustainers from that drive are conflicting goals.

The problem, as we are seeing it, is that an increasing number of stations want both and that's not working.

A few decades ago, when public radio was investing considerable resources in on-air fundraising research and training, I posed the question, "Pledge drive or Fund drive?” That is - is the main purpose of this drive to get donors or money? It is an important question that impacts fund drive strategy, tactics, and messaging.

It turns out that public radio's incredible audience growth over those decades made that question less important than we thought. Most stations picked raising money as their primary goal and got enough new members along the way to grow, even though the percentage of new member donations was quite low.* 

The success of sustainer programs and the importance of acquiring sustainers through on-air drives just might be making "Pledge drive or Fund drive?" a more relevant question today. 


* New givers in most fund drives range from 25% to 35%. It has been that way for a few decades. Flip that number around and it means that 65% to 75% of givers during an on-air fund drive are already in the station’s donor database. These percentages are a result of focusing on raising money during drives over acquiring new givers.

Thursday, February 12, 2015

It’s Taking More Leverage to Generate Pledge Drive Contributions

Our last post covered how it is getting more difficult to generate contributions during public radio pledge drives. We introduced the idea of public radio pledge drive Leverage.  (Pleverage?)

Leverage is the weight of the incentives offered to generate a contribution or to raise a dollar. Leverage is the stuff – premiums, challenge grants, dollar-for-dollar matches, sweepstakes – offered during the drive to spike response rates and influence average gift.

We’re still working on the best way to measure this, but it is an important concept.  On one hand, incentives are a cost to the station – financial and in terms of listener perception. We know from Listener-Focused Fundraising research that commercial-like fundraising tactics create negative perceptions among many listeners and that is a cost.

On the other hand, incentives create an important value proposition for an significant subset of potential givers. This post focuses on the idea of value proposition.

But Wait There’s More!

It used to be that using one incentive at a time was sufficient leverage to meet hourly and daily on-air drive goals. Sometimes two incentives, such as a premium and a dollar-for-dollar match were offered simultaneously. Now, more stations are offering more stuff, simultaneously, to meet their goals.

The questions before us are how much leverage is really necessary for a station to get the results it needs?  And, is there a point where so much leverage is needed to meet the pledge drive goal that it is a sign of an unrealistic goal?

In the interest of full disclosure our company, Sutton & Lee, provides on-air fundraising consulting services to nearly a dozen public radio stations. We are helping many of those stations use increased leverage to meet their goals.

Below is an example of what one major market station offered as sweepstakes prizes during a recent campaign. The example below is not one of our client stations but it represents how a handful of stations have been operating over the past decade and we think it represents where much of the industry is headed.
  • Trip for two to Paris
  • Tanzanian Safari for two
  • Trip to Iceland
  • WWDTM Trip to Chicago
  • Galapagos trip
  • Rome and Florence trip
  • Mercedes Benz
That’s something like $60,000 to $70,000 of prize incentives for just one pledge drive. The station also had several challenges and dollar-for-dollar matches ranging from $10,000 to $50,000. Additionally, a few premiums were set at “loss-leader” pledge levels to boost response rates.

Depending on when a listener was asked, the enticement to respond during this drive would have been entry into sweepstakes for multiple trips, a chance to win a Mercedes, a $50,000 challenge grant, and an attractively priced premium.

The value proposition to the listener is this:

“Give $10 per month now to get a great thank you gift at a special pledge level and also support the station you depend on so you can maintain access to your favorite programs. You’ll also get many chances to win a dream vacation and a chance to win a luxury car all while turning that $10 per month into a $50,000 challenge grant the station can earn if you do it by the end of the hour.”

While this might seem extreme to the outside observer, leaders at this station obviously felt all of these incentives were needed to meet the goal over their planned fundraising footprint. That’s a lot of leverage.

And this station is not alone. Many stations are giving away multiple trips. Others are giving away cars and even tens of thousands of dollars in cash.

It’s Not a Bake Sale Anymore

And it’s not just the sweepstakes that are getting extreme. Some stations offer “early bird” discounts on premiums, where the pledge level starts low and goes up later in the drive. While very commercial sounding, this technique does boost immediate response rates.

Some stations offer “two-for-one” matches where every dollar contributed generates two additional dollars in match money.  To the listener this is, “give $100 right now and the station receives an extra $200 donation from a generous major donor to the station. Right now your pledge has three times the buying power.”

These two-for-one matches can be very effective at generating immediate response. They are often four times more effective than incentive-free fundraising at generating contributions and dollars.

The value proposition of matches is also quite good from the listener perspective. Unlike a sweepstakes, which the listener may or may not win, there is an instant benefit to responding. The listener gives and the station gets even more. Instantly!

The primary downside of two-for-one matches for the station is that a dollar of leverage returns just 50 cents in revenue. The pledges come in faster, which is good, but the cash return on the leverage is lower than the value proposition to the listener.

We’ve seen stations raise less money in an entire day than they used for a two-for-one match during that day. For example, $30,000 in match money generates $15,000 in contributions over a few hours. Then the rest of the day generates $10,000 in pledges. The daily pledge total is $25,000 but it took $30,000 in match money to get it.

It’s a reasonable argument to point out that the any match or challenge in a pledge drive is worthwhile because the station leveraged the pledge drive to obtain the match money commitment in the first place. We agree. That’s one of the great strategic benefits of matches and challenges. They raise money twice for the station, once before the drive and once during the drive.

But from the potential donor’s perspective a two-for-one match is the antepenultimate pledge drive offer. It’s big leverage. The only thing that makes it better is getting a discounted premium and a chance to win a great sweepstakes prize while getting your gift tripled.

Circling back to the big question in front of us, “how much leverage is too much?”

Are we at the point where meeting goals requires offering incentives worth more than the value of the contribution itself?  Is there an ideal ratio of pledge drive dollars to incentive value.

Defining leverage in this way could help underperforming stations get better results or at least better manage their expectations. It could also help stations efficiently meet their goals without going overboard.

Another benefit is improved pledge drive benchmarking. It’s almost impossible to compare results across stations without considering the leverage applied at each station.

Finally, we can’t leave this discussion without asking if there is a point where greater reliance on commercial tactics makes pledge drives even less-listenable and/or erodes the bond between the station and listeners who value the non-commercial nature of public radio. 

Monday, February 02, 2015

Difficult Pledge Drive Days Ahead?

It’s getting harder to generate contributions through public radio pledge drives.  Most stations are still getting good overall results, but the cost of getting those results is going up.

Sometimes the cost is more on-air fundraising. It is taking more of the station’s time and more of the listeners’ time to generate a contribution. Sometimes the cost is greater leverage. That is – stations are having to offer more, or more expensive, incentives to generate a contribution.

Probable Causes

Success with monthly Sustaining givers appears to be having an effect on drives by cutting into the potential number of annual renewals received during the drive. Declining AQH (Average Quarter-Hour) audience is another possible cause. Lower AQH means listeners are using the station less. That could result in listeners being less likely to give.  It certainly reduces the number of potential respondents to an on-air fundraising appeal.

There could be external factors as well. People are being asked to immediately part with their money at unprecedented rates these days. The junk mail and telemarketing calls of 25 years ago now follow us out of our homes and find us 24/7. The amount of daily asks is numbing. Public radio pledge drives appeals are fighting through much more clutter just to be considered let alone acted upon.

Measuring Pledge Drive Success

The primary metric we use to measure on-air fundraising success is Listener-Hours to Generate a Contribution. Using Nielsen Audio audience data, we answer the question, “how many hours of listening must we expose to fundraising to get someone to give?”

Or, put another way, how efficiently are we spending our listeners’ time to get a single contribution? A lower number is better. The goal is to maximize the pledge drive return against the expense of the disrupting the listening experience.

In a PPM-measured market, an efficient pledge drive for an NPR News station generates one contribution for every 300 hours of listening exposed to fundraising. That’s like putting 300 people in an auditorium and playing public radio content for an hour, except that their experience will be interrupted 4 to 5 times in that hour with 4 to 6 minute fundraising appeals. At the end of that hour, one of the 300 people will make a contribution in the amount of an average gift.

Two Trends

We see on-air fundraising following two trends. Some stations are adding more fundraising hours and exposing more listening to pledge drives to meet their goals. The fundraising efficiency metrics at these stations don’t improve, they get worse. The stations still meet their goals, or come relatively close, by applying more brute force.

The other trend involves applying more Leverage to the fundraising ask. We haven’t settled on exactly how to best measure Leverage, but we believe the broader concept is sound. For now, consider the Leverage to be the weight of the incentives offered to generate a contribution or to raise a dollar.

Here’s an example. Ten years ago a station offers a dollar-for-dollar match and the fundraising efficiency is 150 Listener-Hours (LH) per Contribution. That means the match is twice as efficient as the average hour of fundraising, which took twice as many LHs (300) to generate a contribution.

Today that match has an efficiency of 200 LHs per Contribution. It’s less efficient at turning listening in to contributions. So the station decides to offer a free tote-bag to anyone who gives during the match in addition to any other thank you gift they take. More listeners respond to the offer and the efficiency returns to its prior number of 150. The station achieved its prior efficiency by applying more Leverage.

This is happening at a lot of stations across the country stations. They are offering more incentives each drive and offering more of them  simultaneously to maintain fundraising efficiencies.

Is the Problem Too Much Talk About Stuff and Not Enough Talk About Mission?

Probably not.

Mission messages are great for convincing listeners that they should give to the station but they aren’t particularly effective at motivating people to actually pause their busy lives to give at that moment. The well-executed “Mission” focused fundraising hours tend to fall in the 400-500 LH efficiency range.

A pure Mission approach to pledge drives would likely require a plan that exposed listeners to 33% to 50% more fundraising to meet the overall drive goal. That’s like turning a 9-day pledge drive into a 12 to 14-day pledge drive. As you might imagine, longer drives tend to drive efficiencies down even more.

What’s Next?

Subsequent postings on this topic will go a little deeper into Leverage, Sustainers, and off-air fundraising including the use of email, social media and database solutions.

One final note. In the past we’ve observed that public radio might have more of a spending problem than a fundraising problem. The money stations are spending on increased local news offerings and digital initiatives is outpacing their ability to monetize those activities. They are currently money losers. That puts pressure on the core radio service to generate “profits” to subsidize those activities.

One of the possible answers to slipping pledge drive efficiencies is to reduce the revenue burden they must bear through smarter spending on local news and digital.

Labels: ,

Friday, November 21, 2014

Audience 98: Enduring Insights or Now Useless Information?

Yesterday's keynote speech at the Public Radio Super Regional meeting was by Paul Jacobs. He's a radio researcher, radio web app developer, and the incoming Board Chair of Greater Public -- the trade association for fundraising, development, and marketing professionals in public radio and public TV.

Early in his speech, Jacobs took exception to public radio's continued use of findings from a major industry research study published in the late 1990s -- Audience 98

Jacob's criticism was that the research was conducted in 1998. He accentuated that point with a pretty funny set of images of products and services from 1998 that are no longer with us... like Windows 98.

That was it. Audience 98 is old and therefore no longer of value.  "Get over it," he said.

It made for a good laugh. But it also got me to revisit my thinking about Audience 98 and whether its findings could help public radio grow and thrive in this never-ending age of digital disruption. I think the answer is "yes."  And, instead of getting over it, I'm thinking perhaps more people need to get into it. 

In the interest of full disclosure, I worked on the Audience 98 research and I contributed to several Audience 98 reports. After careful consideration of any bias I might have towards my past work, I still think the answer is "yes." 

That's because 16 years later, we continue to successfully apply the lessons learned from Audience 98 in our consulting work with public radio stations and producers. Audience 98 has become especially valuable as we work with people new to public radio who don't know much about the audience and the intersection of listening, values, and giving. It's amazing to see what they can accomplish in radio, in the digital space, and in fundraising once they have that understanding.

Why has Audience 98 endured?

I believe it is because Audience 98 wasn't really a radio research project. It was a research-based blue print for increasing public radio's public service and long-term financial self-sufficiency. Unlike commercial radio research, which is generally designed to help boost the immediate ratings and is expected to have a short shelf life, Audience 98 was designed to provide insights that would stand the test of time. 

What do you think?

Below are a few of the essential insights from Audience 98. Each insight is backed by very specific, actionable research findings to help public radio get more listeners, more listening, and increased financial support from listeners.

I encourage you to spend some time with each of these insights. Ask yourself, "Are these lessons stuck in 1998?" "Are they limited to radio only or could they apply to listening via mobile devices and the desktop?" "Could they apply to public radio generated content that people might read on a mobile device or the desktop?"  "What new information could make them even more valuable to the decisions public radio leaders face today?"

Public radio transcends simple demographics to speak to listeners’ interests, values, and beliefs.
  •       People listen to public radio programming because it resonates with their interests, values, and beliefs. This appeal generally cuts across age, sex and race.
  •       Appeal can also cut across program genres and format types. Different programs and formats may appeal to the same kind of listener as long as they stay focused on that listener’s interests, values, and beliefs.
  •       Changes in the sound and sensibility of programming can alter its appeal. When programming appeal changes, so does the kind of listener it attracts.

Public service begets public support.
  •       Listeners send money to public radio when they rely upon its service and consider it important in their lives.
  •       They are also more inclined to send money when they believe their support is essential and government and institutional funding is minimal.
  •       Public support, like public service, is the product of two factors: the value listeners place on the programming, and the amount of listening done to the programming.
What's your opinion?  Are you over it or into it?  Here's the link to the source material and the entire Audience 98 series of reports if you want more.

Wednesday, November 19, 2014

Is Local News the New Classical Music?

Digital News Guru Ken Doctor presented the opening session today at the public radio Super-Regional meeting in Las Vegas. 

His premise.  Local news presents a great opportunity for public radio.

His logic. There is great potential in the digital space for national news. Jobs are growing in this sector. There's more than $40 billion in digital advertising out there.  And local news in trouble. Revenues are way down. More than 20,000 jobs have been lost. There is a dearth of local reporting and this represents opportunity for public media.

This is the same logic that was used to program public radio in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Public radio was the place to program dying formats.

The problem, as public radio learned by the late 1980s, is that picking up the failed scraps from commercial media does not make for a viable business model.

We often forget that the success public radio has enjoyed over the past several decades came from inventing something new -- a national news, information, and entertainment service delivered locally that created a non-geographic sense of community among  like-minded listeners.  Public radio built a great multi-stream revenue model on this service.  It is the same model being pursued by the start-ups in the national digital new business.

Focusing on local to the detriment of national is to abandon what has made the public radio business model work.

So what does this have to do with classical music?

There has been somewhat of a classical music radio revival in major markets of late. Stations such as WQXR in New York, KING in Seattle, and KDFC in San Francisco flipped from commercial radio to public radio with great success.

These markets are sufficiently large to accommodate the financial needs of classical music radio stations. But most markets are not. That's why they import their classical from syndicated services.
More important, these are brands committed to classical music full-time. They succeed because of their singular focus, their singular appeal.

News is not the singular appeal of public radio.  National and local news can have very different appeals.

This valuable lesson, first learned in the 1980s, still applies today.  Putting too much local content into today’s service is the same problem as trying to have NPR News, Classical, Jazz, Folk, and 8 others types of programming on a single station. It works against the principle of focusing formats based on the appeal of the content. 

If there is a future in local news for public radio, it is establishing a separate service with a separate brand. It is inventing something new that stands on its own. Adding too much local to the current public radio station brand will diminish, not enhance, the brand.

Tuesday, September 16, 2014

Observations on NPR One

The slogan for the NPR One app is “Public Radio Made Personal. The purpose of the app is to help the user create a more customized listening experience.  Stories can be skipped. A recommendation engine personalizes the line-up of offerings. The app draws on NPR’s most current news content, archival pieces, and content from local NPR stations.

NPR One is a good start for what it is trying to do and it will get better. Here are a few early observations about its potential impact on NPR and NPR News stations.

Sonic Station Branding Needs to Improve – a Lot

When it comes to cobranding, NPR News stations fare better in NPR One than in any of NPR’s previous digital audio efforts. An NPR One listening session begins with an NPR/Station cobranded audio ID. Local station newscasts and stories appear throughout listening sessions. Occasionally, there is a second NPR/Station cobranded audio ID, but there is nowhere close to the amount of NPR/Station cobranding listeners hear when using the radio.

That sonic cobranding over the past three decades was an integral part of building the NPR brand and strong station brands. That sonic cobranding is still needed today to maintain strong station brands. It is probably the single most important element of helping stations of all sizes solidify their place in the digital media space.

This is extremely important given that NPR is prohibited by policy from raising money directly from listeners. In order to protect the existing listener-support model, every listening session in the NPR One space has to have NPR/Station cobranding that is as good, or better, than what listeners have experienced over the past three decades. Stations have to get equal credit with NPR for creating quality listening experiences in the digital space or fundraising revenues will eventually drop.

No Sense of Place, No Sense of Time, Inconsistent Pacing

Sense of Place, Sense of Time, and Pacing are three vital aspects of the radio listening experience for many people, especially in the morning. The radio programming elements that create Sense of Place, Sense of Time, and Pacing – time, segment time posts, weather, local information, forward promotion, etc. – are absent from NPR One.

This will be perfectly fine for many NPR One listeners. Some will even embrace it and use NPR One exclusively. It could even be a substantial audience. But the absence of these elements will prevent NPR One from being a “radio killing” app.

The more likely scenario is that NPR One will share substantial audiences with NPR News stations. These shared audiences will want varied listening experiences. It’s not difficult to imagine someone listening to an NPR station live via stream or over the air in morning and afternoon drive and then using NPR One to customize their listening experience during other dayparts. This is something worth testing within the NPR One app, including testing “live now” promotion of key interviews on national and local talk shows.

Weaker Branding of NPR Programs and NPR Hosts

NPR One is creating a bit of a branding mess for NPR's hosts and programs. I’ve heard NPR’s Steve Inskeep, David Greene, Melissa Block, and Scott Simon all introducing stories within the same listening session. It is sometimes difficult to sense who the host is supposed to be. Likewise, the names of multiple NPR programs can appear within the same listening session.

In its current state, the NPR One App transcends the NPR’s major sub-brands such as Morning Edition and All Things Considered. That might just be one of the inevitable side effects of personalizing the listening experience. The source programs of content could end up being irrelevant in NPR One and the role of the programs hosts could be more correspondent-like than host-like.

Pre-Atomization of Content

Atomizing content is curating it in a way that extends its shelf life and makes it easier to discover and consume in the digital space. It is my understanding that a lot of NPR News content is currently atomized after it is presented on the newsmagazines. That’s why, when listening to NPR content on demand, you can still hear a program outcue at the end of an interview or a reference to “this morning” when a host introduces a story. Those are elements of good radio programming that are unnecessary, and even problematic, in the NPR One space.

Expect this to change. Expect more of what you hear in Morning Edition and All Things Considered to be pre-atomized; to be produced to be NPR One-ready without as much editing work on the back end.  Will it change the way NPR’s newsmagazines sound on the radio?  Probably. Will pre-atomization of content hurt the audience performance of Morning Edition and All Things Considered? We don’t know. Maybe it could help.

Maybe the pre-atomization of NPR content will create new branding opportunities for stations around NPR’s flagship programs. Presently, stations face challenges establishing their own brand in the NPR News programs without excising elements of the NPR brand. A more atomized Morning Edition or All Things Considered just might be the best approach to helping stations create stronger local brands without running away from their NPR identity. More on that in a future posting. 

Monday, September 08, 2014

The Increasing Importance of Station Branding in the Digital Space

Well, the blog unintentionally ended up on hiatus for almost 10 months as I launched Emodus Research to study the emotional connections public radio listeners have with NPR and with their stations.

That research is yielding some fascinating insights. Even the process of planning and evaluating that research has uncovered, for me at least, the increasing importance of branding in public radio, particularly when it comes to digital listening and listener support.

I covered some of this in an article published at Current.org about NPR stations staying relevant in the digital age.

We know that station audiences will fragment as more listening options become available. In our research, we're trying to figure how much audience stations might gain, keep, or lose along the way and how valuable those listeners are to a station's membership fundraising.

Here are some of the issues that have surfaced as we consider the implications of this fragmentation.

1. It is well-established that listening to public radio leads to giving to public radio. In that past, all of that listening was station-branded to some degree. Today, an increasing amount of public radio listening is going to digital brands, particularly NPR, that cannot monetize that listening through individual giving. 

2. Based on industry benchmarks, every 1,000,000 hours of listening that shifts from stations to NPR has the potential of costing public radio 250 givers and $30,000 in gross membership contributions. 

For perspective, it takes 200,000 people listening 5 hours per week to generate 1,000,000 hours of listening.

So 200,000 people switching from station-branded listening to NPR-only listening for an entire year (a loss of 52,000,000 hours) could cost public radio 13,000 current or future givers and just over $1.5 million.

Downloads of NPR apps are in the millions. There is a huge financial downside to shifting existing and generating new listening to NPR platforms that are not strongly co-branded with stations. 

3. Failure to convert NPR-direct listening into listener contributions -- at the station or national level -- risks making NPR more dependent on corporate support as stations' ability to pay for NPR declines. Corporate support will likely have to be NPR's fastest growing income segment to keep up with expenses.

Neither the public nor NPR stations will benefit from an NPR that must put corporate support first to survive, but we see that already beginning to happen. The pressure to create new corporate sponsorship opportunities is great. It has strongly influenced the discussion around how NPR News programs are structured (program clocks), the development of digital offerings, and the drive to promise sponsors prime adjacencies to content that puts their sponsorship in a favorable context. 

Let's bring this back to branding. By policy, NPR cannot raise money directly from listeners.  It has no meaningful way to generate listener revenue from NPR-only digital listening.  It stands to reason then that NPR would want to cobrand every single NPR digital listening occasion with an NPR station. 

That branding has to be as good or better than it is today so listeners understand that the station is a key provider of their listening experiences. Anything short of that will cost public radio givers and membership revenue. Yet today, even with NPR One, digital cobranding isn't even close to what is heard on the radio.

More on that, and other NPR One thoughts, in the next post.  


Footnote:  Here's one additional thought about audience fragmentation.  It might hurt station underwriting income before it hurts membership income.

Our research is beginning to show that givers who put high value on Sense of Place and the station's local efforts are more financially valuable than listeners who perceive the station as a middle-man between them and NPR.

There's more research to be done, but an audience drop of 25% might not result in an equal drop in station membership revenue. However, a 25% drop in audience, particularly during the NPR News programs, might have an even larger impact on a station's ability to sell underwriting.